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Post-conflict society, characterised by positive peace requires a thoroughly demobilised 
mindset amongst not only former-combatants, but also those mobilised more broadly 
within conflict. Until now demobilisation programmes have taken a traditional 
understanding of conflict, focusing on armaments, rather than psychologies, ideologies 
and cultures. This has led to an unnatural distinction being made between combatants 
and civilians, where such division is increasingly less evident in fighting. It has also 
caused demobilisation to be continually paired with disarmament, once again 
emphasising the military element of conflict. This ignores the broader sense in which 
people are mobilised in conflicts, as ancillary support and ‘bush wives’.  
 
This paper considers the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) 
programme in Sierra Leone and examines how its standards for registration provide 
some indication as to what it is to be considered ‘mobilised’ during conflict. The overly 
militaristic approach to DDR taken ignores alternative, non-combative roles at the 
broader level of involvement in conflict that, if left unchecked, risk disrupting the 
already fragile post-conflict environment. A case study of women in the Sierra Leonean 
conflict is used to demonstrate how this social group, in both combative and non-
combative capacities, is excluded from DDR programmes. This exclusion results in an 
unfinished process of uprooting the remnants of a war mindset that resides within the 
psychological and material state of those left mobilised, and potentially risks 
undermining the carefully crafted post-conflict peace. 
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And when I leave 
What will I be? 
I can’t be what I was before 
I can’t be what I am during 
I must be something else. 
 










Introduction -  
 2 
The process of demobilisation encompasses a shift from wartime to peacetime, from a 
state of mobilisation to one of demobilisation. It makes assumptions about both the 
nature of war it is transitioning from, and the kind of peace it is attempting to craft. 
Where these assumptions do not capture the realities of the conflict that is being ended 
and the peace that is being forged, demobilisation programmes become less effective in 
facilitating this transition. Who is demobilised at the termination of fighting is 
suggestive of who is perceived as mobilised during conflict. Thus, in order to ensure 
that the peace achieved is one of a positive and sustainable nature, those mobilised in 
fighting need to be demobilised in peace.  
 
The question that this paper examines is who is considered mobilised in conflict and 
why certain other categories are not. Using a Foucauldian approach, particular 
exclusions of demobilisation programmes can be revealed that are otherwise concealed 
by less critical, positivist theories. From an examination of demobilisation, one can infer 
common understandings of mobilisation. This paper takes as its case study the 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme carried out in post-
conflict Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2005. This scenario aptly demonstrates the blurring 
of traditional security divides, including civilian/combatant, victim/perpetrator and 
protector/protected, that no longer operate (if in fact they ever did) with such clarity in 
contemporary wars. The exclusions inherent to the DDR process in Sierra Leone afford 
insight into the limited understandings of mobilisation that currently predominate. Such 
exclusions risk undermining a fragile peace by allowing significant segments of the 
population to retain a mobilised mindset, susceptible to inflammation. The critical 
approach taken in this paper considers specifically the exclusion of women from DDR 
programmes, in both combative and non-combative capacities. Their absence from such 
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processes highlights the material- and armament-focus of DDR, ultimately manifesting 
itself as a masculinist activity. In order to avoid this exclusion and maximise prospects 
for the establishment of positive peace, it is contended that demobilisation needs to be 
decoupled from disarmament. This separation will allow demobilisation to be 
understood as a psychological, ideational and cultural process, as well as a material one, 
recognising that conflict must be resolved not solely by dismantling armed groups, but 
also by dismantling cultures of violence. This will provide a wider registration standard 
for DDR programmes, recognising the mobilisation of women and non-combative 
actors. On a broader level it will also promote a more comprehensive understanding of 
security - one that more accurately reflects the nature of conflicts (such as Sierra Leone) 
currently taking place. 
 
The paper shall proceed by first establishing common elements of DDR programmes 
and the broad, theoretical basis of demobilisation: what it is, how it has evolved and its 
potential to exclude. Second, from this point, a Foucauldian method of oppositional 
knowledge shall be drawn upon to infer an understanding of mobilisation that reveals a 
material-, armament- and masculinist-approach to DDR. Such an outlook assumes a 
traditional idea of conflict with clear civilian/combatant, victim/perpetrator and 
protector/protected divides that do not necessarily exist in contemporary wars. Third, a 
case study of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone will demonstrate the application of 
DDR to such conflicts, setting out the context of the civil war, the DDR process itself 
and the exclusions (specifically of women) manifest within it. Fourth, the problems of 
perception that inhibit women being viewed as legitimately mobilised shall be examined, 
explicating their continual low-representation in DDR programmes and considering the 
implications. Finally, a way to reunderstand demobilisation in a less exclusive and 
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traditionally-bound manner will be proposed through decoupling from disarmament. 
The broader approach to demobilisation that this separation allows raises questions of 
where demobilisation lies on the development/security spectrum. Duffield‟s linking of 
these two realms provides an innovative method for conceiving of demobilisation from 
a more developmental and less security-focused perspective. This approach allows a 
broader understanding of conflict and what it is to be mobilised within it.  
 
The issues of demobilisation, women in war and contemporary conflict have each 
independently garnered a substantial body of academic literature, illuminating a diverse 
range of viewpoints. One could mention here, for example, the work of Kees Kingma 
on demobilisation
1
, Paul Richards on Sierra Leone
2
 and Jan Jindy Pettman and Chris 
Coulter on women in war.
3
 A vast pool of resources also lies in primary source reports 
from non- and inter-governmental organisations and research institutes, such as Susan 
McKay‟s and Dyan Mazurana‟s investigation of girl soldiers.
4
 Yet there is little that 
draws these arenas together and considers the disconnect that emerges when one does.  
 
The issue of mobilisation specifically is one that has been largely neglected, perhaps 
implying that it is something considered obvious. Yet an examination of the 
aforementioned literature reveals that this is far from the case. The broader-based 
mobilisation that is characteristic of new wars has not been paralleled by an acceptance 
of women, as the excluded category discussed here, as a legitimate component of post-
                                               
1 Kees Kingma (ed.), Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 2000).  
2 Paul Richards, Fighting for the Rainforest, (Oxford: James Currey, 1996); Paul Richards, Steven 
Archibald, Khadija Bah and James Vincent, „Where Have all the Young People Gone?: Transitioning Ex-
Combatants Towards Community Reconstruction After the War in Sierra Leone‟, 30 November 2003. 
3 Jan Jindy Pettman, Worlding Women, (London: Routledge, 1996); Chris Coulter, „The Post-War 
Moment: Female Fighters in Sierra Leone‟, Working Paper 22, Forced Migration Studies Programme, 
University of Witwatersrand, November 2005. 
4 Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana, „Where Are the Girls?: Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, 
Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their Lives During and After War‟, International Centre for Human 
Rights and Democratic Development, 2004. 
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conflict demobilisation. (This is not to suggest that women are the only excluded 
category. Indeed, children, traditional warriors, non-combative men and the disabled are 
also excluded to varying degrees). An examination of this phenomenon then also taps 
into literature on the role of women in war and images of fighting women. This paper 
thus serves as a linking tool to examine the interstices between these insufficiently 
bonded subjects. It aims to establish a line of dialogue across these terrains to touch 
upon the neglected question of what it is to be mobilised in modern conflict. 
 
Before embarking upon this project, four caveats need to be mentioned. First, Sierra 
Leone has been taken as a particular case study as it highlights the blurring of traditional 
wartime distinctions, such as civilian/combatant and victim/perpetrator. The DDR 
process carried out there is also recent, and largely perceived as one of the more 
successful of its kind. This heightens its utility as an archetypal programme to be 
scrutinised. The findings within this paper however should not be considered as relevant 
only to the limited context of Sierra Leone. As shall be demonstrated, many of the 
issues raised are endemic to demobilisation efforts more generally. In this sense, Sierra 
Leone operates predominately as the contemporary setting in which demobilisation and 
its exclusions play out. While inevitably some interactions will be case specific, the 
Sierra Leone context also exhibits features that are part of broader trends.  
 
Second, women are considered as the excluded category because there is significant 
literature on their roles in conflict, and because of the intriguing social and historical 
milieu that shapes perceptions about the mingling of women and war. The paper by no 
means suggests that women are the only excluded group, merely that their exclusion is 
important and overlooked.  
 6 
 
Third, references to „contemporary conflict‟ or „new wars‟ are frequent throughout the 
paper and, without explanation, risk becoming meaningless tropes. Here they are used 
to refer to the largely intra-state conflicts that have broken out throughout the less 
developed world since the 1990s. Often referred to as new wars
5
 or fourth generation 
warfare
6
, these conflicts break with traditional conceptions (though not necessarily 
practices) of conflict with their clear distinctions between civilians/combatants, 
victim/perpetrator, home/front et cetera.  
 
Fourth, at times a seeming conflation of demobilisation and DDR programmes emerges 
throughout the paper that needs clarification. The practice of demobilisation predates 
DDR programmes, as the historical lineage of the concept in Chapter 1 shall 
demonstrate. Since the 1990s demobilisation has been predominantly a practice carried 
out within the DDR framework. Thus, demobilisation practices as they currently stand 
(that is, within DDR) are tied to a history of the concept of demobilisation from earlier, 
not-DDR, demobilisation practices. Speaking contemporarily however, it becomes 
difficult to separate demobilisation and DDR, because the two always exist in unison. 
Exclusions from demobilisation occur, as shall be argued throughout this paper, largely 
because of the persistent pairing of demobilisation with the other DDR components. It 
should also be noted that the reintegration phase of DDR will not be considered within 
this paper. This is not to discount its importance or need for investigation, but merely 
that it lies outside the scope of this paper and does not bear directly on the question of 
mobilisation discussed herein. 
                                               
5 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 5. 
6 William S. Lind, „The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation‟, Marine Corps Gazette, 
October 1989, pp. 22-26. 
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The final mention to be made is to account for the critical approach taken. Given that 
the premise of this paper is to investigate the position of those who fall outside the 
ambit of dominant demobilisation practices and thus outside of its guiding theory, 
dominant approaches will only continue to miss what this paper seeks to find: that is, 
the inclusion of those currently not appearing on the radar. Thus, it is outside of the 
incumbent theories of conflict and politics that the intersection of demobilisation, 
gender exclusion and modern conflict is best illuminated. With these provisos in mind, a 
theoretical background to demobilisation can be provided that will facilitate the more 














Ch.1 – Demobilisation in Theory 
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An effective examination of the disconnect between understandings of demobilisation 
and mobilisation as they apply to contemporary conflict requires that demobilisation, 
and how DDR programmes apply it to post-conflict communities, be understood. A 
prototype DDR programme shall thus be sketched below, highlighting the relevance of 
DDR exclusions outside of the Sierra Leone context alone. The lineage of the concept 
and purpose of demobilisation shall then also be provided, demonstrating some of the 
inconsistencies which arise in applying DDR models to contemporary conflicts. Each of 
these aspects highlights the broad spectrum of privileges and exclusions inherent within 
demobilisation processes, and the negative impact that the legacy of the concept of 
demobilisation has had upon the practical application of DDR programmes in modern 
war.   
 
While consideration of the exclusion of women in the context of Sierra Leone is quite 
specific, broader exclusions and their relevance apply to a much wider theatre of DDR 
programmes and post-conflict situations. Despite attempts to tailor DDR programmes to 
specific country and conflict settings, their application has taken a surprisingly one-size-
fits-all approach.
7
 Such routine treatment suggests either an overrated sense of success 
or apathetic disposition amongst DDR practitioners, both resulting in a lack of 
innovation and ingenuity. In order to magnify the exclusions inherent within DDR and 
highlight their relevance at a level broader than just Sierra Leone, a typical programme 
structure will be provided. Variations of this model have been implemented in locations 
as diverse as Guatemala, Angola, Eritrea, Kosovo and East Timor.
8
 While Sierra Leone 
is taken as the case study in this paper, as it reveals a particular intersection between 
                                               
7 Chris Coulter, „The Post-War Moment‟, p. 4. 
8 Elizabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, „Women, War, Peace‟, Progress of the World‟s Women, v1, 
(UNIFEM: New York, 2002), p. 118. 
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contemporary conflict, women, mobilisation and post-conflict life, these findings may 
in fact be pertinent in other DDR scenarios. The framework provided below seeks to 
highlight how some of the exclusions to be discussed specifically in relation to Sierra 
Leone also emerge in other DDR programmes, as all have taken the following as their 
base model. 
 
DDR programmes are initiated by independent third parties (usually a grouping of 
foreign governments, the United Nations, and inter- and non-governmental 
organisations) when parties to a conflict reach a ceasefire or peace agreement, when one 
party emerges victorious over another, or when both sides are forced to cease fighting 
due to unsustainable resources.
9
 It comprises combatants of formal and/or informal 
armed groups first being registered by meeting particular requirements (almost 
exclusively this has been the handing in of a conventional weapon or rounds of 
ammunition, constituting the disarmament phase).
10
 Once this prerequisite has been 
fulfilled, combatants are cantoned in demobilisation camps where they give up uniforms, 
rank and other military paraphernalia and begin the process of disassociation from 
military life.
11
 In early programmes, combatants were provided solely with a cash 
incentive, with the intention of easing costs of reintegration into civilian life.
12
 A cash 
sum is still commonplace, though it is now usually provided in conjunction with skills 
training and may also include foodstuffs, agricultural implements or seeds, clothing, 
                                               
9Mark Knight and Alpaslan Ozerdem, „Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace‟, Journal of Peace Research, v41(4), 
2004, pp. 499-500. 
10 Robert Muggah, „Emerging from the Shadow of War: A Critical Perspective on DDR and Weapons 
Reduction in the Post-Conflict Period‟, Contemporary Security Policy, v27(1), April 2006, p. 199. 
11 Knight and Ozerdem, „Guns, Camps and Cash‟, pp. 499-500;503. 
12 Kees Kingma and Kiflemariam Grebrewold, „Demilitarisation, Reintegration and Conflict Prevention 
in the Horn of Africa‟, Discussion Paper, Bonn International Centre for Conversion and Saferworld, July 
1998, p. 6. 
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payment of school fees, career or personal counselling services or housing materials.
13
 
A greater emphasis is being placed on providing non-transferable incentives, as cash has 
been used to purchase newer, more dangerous weapons, thus facilitating the 
proliferation, rather than the cessation, of violence.
14
 Reintegration then occurs by 
transporting the now former-combatants to their home (or chosen alternative) 
communities.
15
 More recently, efforts have been made to carry out community 
consultation in order to raise awareness of the difficulties of reintegration.
16
 Outside of 
such initiatives however, those who are not eligible for the DDR programme receive no 
demobilisation efforts. The categories of combative women and children (considered to 
be the most vulnerable category of persons in conflict and post-conflict situations), 





This DDR programme archetype has been the result of an ever-evolving purpose of its 
bundled components: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Of interest here, 
the purpose of demobilisation has morphed from one of purely neutralising potential for 
disruption of peace by former-combatants, to one of ensuring social cohesion of 
communities and successful conversion of combatants into civilian life.
18
 Yet its legacy 
of application to traditional conflicts, its continual coupling with disarmament and its 
resultant male-orientation, make it problematic in relation to contemporary conflict.  
                                               
13 Ibid. 
14 Knight and Ozerdem, „Guns, Camps and Cash‟, p. 505. 
15 Kees Kingma, „Demobilisation, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Southern Africa, in Kees Kingma 
and Peter Batchelor (eds.), Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in Southern Africa, (Bonn: Bonn 
International Centre for Conversion, 2004), p. 135. 
16 Kees Kingma, „Demobilisation, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa‟, in Edward Newman and 
Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Recovering from Civil Conflict, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 192. 
17 Richards et al, „Where Have all the Young People Gone?‟, p. 4. 
18 Knight and Ozerdem, „Guns, Camps and Cash‟, p. 500. 
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 By way of historical account, demobilisation has traditionally referred to the 
downsizing of formal state armed forces at the end of interstate conflict.
19
 For example, 
at the end of World War II, state armies of the major powers underwent one of the 
largest decommissioning programmes of military personnel in modern history.
20
 Such 
manpower was no longer needed for the war effort or economically viable in peacetime. 
Military personnel surrendered their ranks and uniform, participated in 
decommissioning and re-entered civilian life. This framework assumed the context of a 
clear combatant/non-combatant and home/front divide.
21
 Contemporary conflicts do not 
necessarily operate with such clarity and the application of demobilisation, as 
traditionally understood, upon them may thus prove inadequate.
22
 Where informal 
armed groups have permeated the space between civilian and soldier, demobilisation 
becomes an ambiguous process of sorting the legitimate from the illegitimate fighter-
claims. Where a conflict's 'front' has also been its 'home', participation in the war effort 
will be broader-based and civilian/soldier distinctions less obvious.
23
 Thus, the 
traditional model of demobilisation is problematic where it is simply superimposed 
upon contemporary conflicts. How one navigates the gaps of applying demobilisation to 
these conflict situations is thus crucial to post-conflict peace. 
  
Despite the inconsistencies between demobilisation‟s original purpose and the nature of 
contemporary conflict, a return to the language of demobilisation occurred throughout 
                                               
19 Kees Kingma, 'Assessing Demobilisation: Conceptual Issues', in Kingma, Demobilisation in Sub-
Saharan Africa, pp. 26-27. 
20 Guy Lamb, „Demilitarisation and Peace-Building in Southern Africa‟, South African Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, September 1997, 
<http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/staff_papers/guy_demil_peace.html>, accessed 11 July 2006. 
21 Miriam Cooke, „WOman, Retelling the War Myth‟, in Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott (eds.), 
Gendering War Talk, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 182. 
22 Honor Fagan, 'Women, War and Peace: Engendering Conflict in Post-Structuralist Perspective', in 
Ronaldo Munck and Purnaka L. De Silva (eds.), Postmodern Insurgencies, (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 
2000), p. 204. 
23 Cooke, „WOman, Retelling the War Myth, p. 182. 
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the 1990s. DDR test case programmes were carried out in Namibia, Cambodia and El 
Salvador, largely sponsored by the United Nations and the World Bank.
24
 A 
proliferation of such programmes and funding for them has since seen more than fifteen 
DDR initiatives since their revival and a general acceptance of their value to 
peacebuilding endeavours.
25
 The original intention of demobilisation in these new 
conflict scenarios was to neutralise potential spoilers of peace agreements or 
ceasefires.
26
 Thus, those demobilised were those considered a potential threat to peace. 
Traditional gender stereotypes and Western traditions of conflict, which assume grown 
men to be aggressive and women to be passive, (to be further discussed in Chapter 4) 
played a prominent role in this regard.
27
 These assumptions ensured that in early DDR 
programmes those designated as suitable for demobilisation were almost wholly adult 
males.
 28
 This discrimination was fortified by the rigid registration requirements set out 
further below, that recognised only conventional weapons (predominantly the 
Kalashnikov, or AK-47) as legitimate proof of combatant status.
29
 Such strictures also 
manifest in the exclusion of non-combative, yet still mobilised, auxiliary support 
personnel, traditional juju warriors, who fought with homemade weapons and voodoo 
magic, and women and child soldiers, who often had their weapons removed by male 
commanders prior to DDR registration.
30
 Again, the distinctions that DDR relies upon 
for its success do not necessarily exist in the contexts to which they are being applied. 
The blurring of combatants and civilians and the diversity of their tools of fighting do 
not correspond to conventional conceptions of conflict. Attempts to force such an 
                                               
24 Muggah, 'Emerging from the Shadow of War', p. 194. 
25 Kingma, 'Demobilisation, Reintegration and Peacebuilding in Africa', p. 181. 
26 Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf, 'Women War Peace', p. 118. 
27 Pettman, Worlding Women, p. 89. 
28 Richards et al, „Where Have all the Young People Gone?‟, p. 12. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Joe Alie, „The Kamajor Militia in Sierra Leone: Liberators or Nihilists?‟, in David J. Francis (ed.), Civil 
Militia, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 63. 
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imperfect model upon an ill-fitting post-conflict setting results only in exclusions and 
missed opportunities to build a positive peace, as shall be gleaned from the analysis in 
this paper. 
 
Demobilisation has also been consistently paired with the weapons reduction-focus of 
disarmament, which has a longer history and often overshadows the looser components 
of demobilisation and reintegration within DDR.
31
 Taking demobilisation to be a 
material, armaments-focused process, and neglecting its less tangible psychological, 
cultural and ideational elements, again reinforces particular privileging. Those who 
were mobilised through the possession of a weapon are recognised to the exclusion of 
those alternatively mobilised. Again, women and children who had their weapons 
removed prior to DDR registration, juju warriors who fought with traditional weapons 
and those personnel performing non-combative roles, are not able to gain access to the 
benefits of DDR programmes due to the overly-restrictive standards imposed.
32
 It is not 
in dispute that those mobilised in the conventional understanding of the term (that is, 
with recognised weapons) are in palpable need of demobilisation, but rather that the 
limiting of DDR processes to this conventional conception of conflict and what it is to 
be mobilised within it, is. It implies that the post-conflict moment is at threat only from 
a tangible return to armed conflict. This neglects the danger of a fragile peace being 
weakened by community tension and mistrust, resulting from a lack of thorough 
dismantling of the war mentality that pervades the minds of more than just the armed 
warriors. Such a broader focus is necessary to ensure that a positive, not merely 
negative, peace is achieved. 
 
                                               
31 Muggah, 'Emerging from the Shadow of War', p. 195. 
32 David J. Francis, „Introduction‟ in Francis, Civil Militia, p. 14. 
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Despite deficiencies within the demobilisation framework, DDR programmes have 
become a mainstay of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.
33
 Former United Nations 
Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros Ghali officially confirmed the critical role of 
demobilisation in the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace.
34
 The purpose of 
demobilisation has been recognised as contributing not only to the preservation of peace 
agreements and ceasefires, but to reconstituting the civilian within the combatant.
35
 That 
is, ensuring that former-combatants are given the tools (both material and, to a lesser 
extent, psychological) to play an integral part in post-conflict, civilian life. This 
recognition of the usefulness of DDR stems from an increasing emphasis on positive, 
rather than merely negative, peace.
36
 Those implementing DDR programmes now strive 
not for just the absence of violence, but for acceptance of former-combatants into 
communities and cooperation amongst them. This kind of positive peace actively 
prevents the renewal of fighting because peace becomes fortified by community 
cohesion.
37
 Positive peace is surely threatened when DDR programmes fail to 
demobilise and „re-civilianise‟ all those who were mobilised in conflict. Those excluded 
from DDR, whether combative or non-combative personnel, are, by implication, not 
officially considered „mobilised‟. This is likely to rouse feelings that their contribution 
to the conflict (possibly an independence struggle) has been undervalued and they may 
maintain the mobilised mindset that facilitated their wartime involvement.
38
 
Unacknowledged and still mobilised, such forgotten categories may well feel frustrated 
and discontent with the post-conflict transition, potentially begetting a return to 
                                               
33 Muggah, „Emerging from the Shadow of War‟, p. 195. 
34 „Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 50th 
Anniversary of the United Nations‟, A/50/60, (New York: United Nations, 1995). 
35 Ibid, p. 200. 
36 Joanna Spear, „From Political Economies of War to Political Economies of Peace: The Contribution of 
DDR after Wars of Predation‟, Contemporary Security Policy, v27(1), April 2006, pp. 172-173. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Pierre du Toit, South Africa’s Brittle Peace: The Problem of Post-Settlement Violence, (Houndsmills: 




 Incomplete demobilisation programmes may therefore constitute a potential 
threat to the carefully crafted positive peace that development practitioners aim for. To 
close the gap and ensure an effectively demobilised, and thus peaceful society, DDR 
programmes must part with their framework based on traditional conflict that does not 
always reflect the nature of contemporary wars. Decoupling demobilisation from 
disarmament and accepting an obscuring of the conventional divides, such as 
civilian/combatant, will allow for demobilisation programmes to be broadened in scope, 
in order to better fit contemporary conflicts and thus avoid exclusions that will 
otherwise detract from post-conflict peace. 
 
The overview provided in this chapter of the evolution of the purpose of demobilisation 
and an archetypal DDR programme, are intended to frame the issues of exclusion from 
the demobilisation process, which determines who is, and who is not, recognised as 
mobilised in conflict. To be consistent, broader understandings of peace, that is, positive 
rather than merely negative, need to also imply broader understandings of conflict.
40
 
Those who are essential to maintaining a society characterised by positive peace need to 
be recognised as such and valued throughout the demobilisation process. Mobilised in 
their various ways throughout the conflict, those excluded are left with a culture, 
psychology and mindset of a person in conflict.
41
 Through the armaments-focused 
registration requirement of a conventional weapon and the neglect of alternative conflict 
roles that many of those mobilised played, DDR programmes significantly miss 
achieving their broadened purpose of positive peace. From this appreciation of 
demobilisation, Foucault‟s oppositional knowledge can be employed in the proceeding 
                                               
39 Ibid. 
40 Pettman, Worlding Women, p. 90. 
41 Marie Breen Smyth, „The Process of Demilitarisation and the Reversibility of the Peace Process in 
Northern Ireland‟, Terrorism and Political Violence, v16(3), Autumn 2004, p. 548. 
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chapter to infer an understanding of mobilisation, which may then be critiqued 






































Ch.2 – Inferring Mobilisation 
 
The question of what it means to be mobilised in conflict arises when one must decide 
who qualifies for demobilisation and who does not. It touches upon the very nature of 
violent conflict and the roles recognised within it. This chapter posits that the question 
of mobilisation is importantly more complex than has traditionally been conceived. 
Beyond the understanding of mobilisation as the official listing of the rank and file of 
formal state armed forces, the territory of mobilisation has been left almost exclusively 
unchartered.
42
 Obscured further by contemporary conflicts, with their lack of traditional 
divides between civilians and combatants, victims and perpetrators, the question of 
mobilisation has been buried beneath conversations of who is to be demobilised. Yet 
surely it is impossible to distinguish those requiring demobilisation when uncertainty 
exists as to who is mobilised in the first place? This chapter therefore seeks to clarify 
mobilisation by using Foucault‟s oppositional knowledge to infer meaning from what is 
known about demobilisation. The understanding of mobilisation uncovered may then be 
measured against contemporary conflict to ascertain its accuracy of reflection and 
usefulness.
43
    
 
In studying mental health regimes, Foucault determined that sanity and insanity are co-
dependent concepts, relying upon the existence of each other to ensure their own 
distinctiveness.
44
 Thus, what it is to be sane is constructed in relation to what it is to be 
insane. In application here then, what it is to be mobilised is constructed in relation to 
what it is to be demobilised. Based upon the DDR model in the preceding chapter, this 
                                               
42 Mats Berdal, „Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars‟, Adelphi Paper 303, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 39. 
43 It should be caveated here that while this argument draws upon Foucault‟s work, it does not attempt to 
transpose his entire theoretical edifice. Rather, contributions are selectively applied that help to expose 
the relational nature of mobilisation and demobilisation and how they represent a particular construction.  
44 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (London: 
Vintage, 1988). 
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implies that to be mobilised is to possess a weapon or rounds of ammunition, to be a 
part of a formal or informal armed group and to be able to tangibly prove such 
possession and involvement. What this implies then, is that those who administer DDR 
programmes have the final word on what it is to be mobilised, just as the medical 
profession determine what it is to be insane.
45
 Their knowledge and expertise of DDR is 
therefore supposed to equip them with the know-how to navigate the border between 
mobilised and unmobilised status. Yet this knowledge that they possess is not itself 
natural or true, meaning that it has no claim to be the correct and qualified knowledge 
because it is justified only by its own assumptions of that knowledge. It is particular and 
thus includes and excludes according to its own, arbitrary logic.
46
 In the case of 
demobilisation/mobilisation, as shall be set out below, a masculinised approach is 
privileged.     
 
The requirements for proving ones eligibility for demobilisation programmes suggests 
that a state of mobilisation is tangible and material. It can be physically verified by the 
possession of a weapon. This approach ignores the intangibles of the psychological, 
ideational and cultural states of mobilisation.
47
 The mindset that legitimates what is 
done with material weapons is left intact and not perceived as dangerous. Viewing 
mobilisation in this way, those who operate under a psychology and culture that views 
violence as a legitimate tool for resolving conflict, but do not actually possess the 
material means to wield such violence, are not eligible for demobilisation and are 
therefore not considered mobilised. This excludes auxiliary personnel (most often 
women) who carry out a vast array of support functions from spying, cooking, 
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strategising to providing sexual services, roles integral to the waging of contemporary 




Taking an armament focus also privileges the male role in conflict and legitimises it as 
being „more mobilised‟ than the female role.
49
 The confiscation of weapons from 
female fighters by their male superiors and their tendency to carry out overlapping roles 
(fighter and bush wife, for example) decrease their access to weapons.
50
 Being 
incognisant of this, DDR programmes disproportionately exclude women from 
registration and thus simultaneously deny them the label of „mobilised‟. Both 
mobilisation and demobilisation thus become overwhelming masculine, cementing 
perceptions of war as a male activity. For this reason, the ways in which women are 
mobilised need to be brought to the fore in order to dislodge the assumed correlation 
between men and war.  
 
In order to recognise the particular discourse of security that mobilisation and 
demobilisation are located within, the distortions that shroud this must be unveiled. 
Determining who falls into the category of mobilised is based on a particular knowledge 
of what demobilisation is (in the same way that sanity is determined by those who claim 
to know what insanity is). This knowledge upon which DDR practitioners rely is 
legitimised by the dominant discourse of security, which is no more „true‟ or „rational‟ 
than alternative discourses.
51
 Rather, such knowledge is founded upon certain power 
relationships that privilege the material, the gun and the masculine. Foucault recognises 
such arbitrary knowledge bases and resolves that everything is therefore dangerous, 
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requiring “hyper-pessimistic activism” to constantly question and reassess the 
incumbent knowledge system legitimising the dominant discourse and actions carried 
out through its logic.
52
 The picture of mobilisation that is painted by understandings of 
demobilisation must therefore be contrasted against the nature of contemporary conflict, 
to unveil perspectives it dangerously cloaks as absent. Dangerously, because little is 
done to recognise that the understanding of demobilisation and mobilisation promoted 
by DDR practitioners is particular and, at best, a part-truth. While any alternative DDR 
formulation posited will also inevitably exclude and self-legitimise, where the 
opportunity for meaningful participation in post-conflict society is denied to a 
significant category of the population, is where the poststructuralist deconstructive 
project must end and an attempt to construct a least exclusionary practice must be built. 
 
This view of the demobilisation/mobilisation mirror is grounded in an increasingly 
inapplicable concept of contemporary conflict. War is represented as an activity 
perpetrated by men with guns, distinct in their mobilised status from civilian victims. 
The emphasis is on a material form of mobilisation – on the gun, rather than the mindset 
that allows the gun to be used in a violent way. It also clings to an increasingly outdated 
divide between civilians and combatants and victims and perpetrators. Such approaches 
do not necessarily reflect the nature of wars being fought.
53
 The case study of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone in the following chapter demonstrates this in more detail, but it 
is useful to highlight here some general trends of which understandings of mobilisation 
and demobilisation seem to be unaware.  
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Modern conflicts take place under a fog of indistinction, with constant overlap between 
civilians and combatants, victims and perpetrators, home and front, and protector and 
protected roles.
54
 Such murkiness limits the applicability of traditional conflict theories 
that rely upon these very distinctions being superimposed upon new wars. Rather, new 
models for interpreting conflict need to be devised, taking into account the blurring of 
traditional divides that have previously given war its discernable logic and allowed 
interventions in such conflicts a measure of success. In order to begin to understand 
contemporary wars so that what mobilises them can be demobilised, their very 
constitution requires analysis. 
  
The discipline of peace studies was transformed by the recognition of positive, as 
opposed to negative peace, being more than simply „not war‟.
55
 Positive peace became 
an initiative in itself, continuing long after violent conflict had ceased. It aimed to build 
peace, not merely dismember war.
56
 In the same way, complex understandings of 
conflict need to recognise that war is not simply the absence of peace. It too has a 
constructive project (albeit with destructive aims) to foster a war culture that perpetuate 
violence from which a warring elite profit. These are the structures of war that permeate 
the economy, politics and the population, acting to mobilise each to further embed the 
conflict.
57
 A mobilised population rationalises violence as a legitimate tool for resolving 
disputes.
58
 While this mentality is not a material factor, it is a vital component of the 
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war machine that acts as the catalyst for picking up the material gun. This intangible 
precedes the material and thus is surely also as central, if not more so, to the question of 
mobilisation. Darby and McGinty have recognised this non-material aspect of 
mobilisation as a „custom of violence‟ stating that: 
Many people…do not live in the war zone, but…are also affected by the custom  
of violence. This does not mean that large numbers of people became engaged in  
violent actions. It does not even mean that they acquiesce in those actions. It means  
that violence and its effects have worked their way into the very fabric of society  
and become part of normal life so that they become accustomed to the routine use  
of violence to determine political and social outcomes.59  
 
Thus, while individual combatants may undergo a process of demobilisation, a society‟s 
culture and discourse remains combative.
60
 A person in possession of a weapon without 
this mobilised mindset surely has less of a claim to mobilised status than a person 
mobilised psychologically, but without access to the material means to act. To be 
comprehensively effective then, demobilisation mechanisms must dismember these 
structures that fortify conflict, and recognise them as a crucial component of what it is 
to be mobilised. As Breen Smyth notes: 
Demobilisation…must reach into all those aspects of civilian life and culture that have  
become militarised during the conflict, in order to provide the cultural and ideological 
conditions under which peaceful, democratic and non-military methods of governance  
can underpin the transition to peace.61 
 
Whether this approach to demobilisation renders it excessively loose and impractical in 
application, will be discussed in the final chapter, where an attempt to reconfigure DDR 
will be undertaken. This paper proceeds then, on the basis that understandings of 
inferred mobilisation are overly-restrictive due to a limited approach to demobilisation 
adopted by DDR programmes. The following chapter provides a case study of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone, highlighting how the roles of women were neglected in the 
demobilisation process. 
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Ch. 3 – Sierra Leone, Women and DDR 
 
Sierra Leone has been chosen as the case study for this paper as it illuminates the 
question of what it is to be mobilised in contemporary conflict, though the intersection 
of demobilisation programmes and gender exclusion. It also illustrates the nature of 
modern warfare as inconsistent with the assumptions that traditional demobilisation 
programmes presuppose. These assumptions relate mostly to how one determines who 
is mobilised. Who one considers mobilised is a crucial determinant in navigating rights 
and responsibilities under international law, strategising war and, central to this paper, 
ensuring the establishment of sustainable, positive, post-conflict peace. This chapter 
will first set out the nature of the conflict in Sierra Leone, highlighting specifically the 
diverse roles played by women within it. Following will be an examination of the DDR 
programme and how it operated to exclude women. This discussion will then lead into a 
detailed investigation in the following chapter of how gender and conflict collide to 
produce rigid assumptions about who is considered mobilised. 
 
The decade-long civil war in Sierra Leone was part of a string of conflicts in the West 
African region that fed into and sustained each other.
62
 It began in 1991 with attacks in 
the Eastern provinces of Kailahun and Pujeha by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 
trained and funded by Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor.
63
 The purpose was to gain 
greater access to diamond mines within Sierra Leone, best achieved by destabilising the 
government and creating chaos through terror amongst the civilian population.
64
 
Irregular soldiers were recruited from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, 
Gambia and Cote D‟Ivoire.
65
 Foreign recruits were largely motivated by personal profit 
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and a lack of alternative employment, whereas many Sierra Leonean fighters have 





The fighting that ensued resulted in the country being effectively split in two between 
the areas remaining under government control, and those terrorised by the RUF. Sierra 
Leonean Army (SLA) soldiers, recognising the lucrative benefits of pillaging and 
diamond mine theft, took to posing as rebels, resulting in the „sobel‟ phenomenon – 
soldiers by day, rebels by night.
67
 This crossover isolated civilians even further, 
prompting them to take security into their own hands by forming civilian defence forces 
(CDFs), such as the Kamajors, Donsos and Tamaboros.
68
 A strict view of traditional 
conflict would view CDFs as oxymoronic, as they violate the civilian/combatant divide 
by allowing the two roles to exist contemporaneously. Yet this phenomenon is 
representative of the changed nature of warfare that traditional conflict mechanisms, 
such as current DDR formulations, fail to recognise. Tactics of rape, torture, mutilation, 
abduction and pillaging were common amongst the RUF, with the SLA and some CDFs 
also complicit in committing such atrocities. The amputation of limbs was 
commonplace as was the forced killing of ones family members.
69
 The RUF in 
particular extensively used recruitment through abduction, creating a unique 
civilian/combatant and victim/perpetrator crossover.
70
 In 1997, after devastating most of 
Sierra Leone, the RUF and SLA formed an alliance and requested CDF surrender. The 
largest and most formidable of the civilian forces, the Kamajors, refused and fighting 
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continued. Peacekeeping efforts by the Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and later the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) led to the eventual cessation of hostilities with the 1999 Lomé Peace 
Agreement, reinforced after a return to fighting by the 2001 Abuja Agreement.
71
 The 
conflict was officially declared over in January 2001.  
 
It is interesting to note that representing the conflict without explicit reference to gender, 
as above, generally summons pictures to mind of young, machine gun-clad men. It is for 
this reason, and the fact that this myopically-gendered lens translates into practical 
effect through demobilisation programmes, that the roles of women specifically are here 
examined. Women in Sierra Leone operated as the traverses of traditional divides in 
conflict – between civilian and combatant, victim and perpetrator and protector and 
protected. Women fought with the RUF in both combative and non-combative 
capacities, (with some estimates of their numbers as high as one third of the entire force) 
and with the CDFs.
72
 RUF battalions operated a Combat Wives Unit with exclusively 
female combatants, wielding „sista berettas‟ (Beretta submachine guns).
73
 Some became 
instructors in RUF ideology and trainers within the Vanguard (the RUF elite). Others 
were charged with policing captives, acting as bodyguards and spying.
74
 In such 
capacities these women were clearly mobilised in conflict, according to traditional 
assumptions that one must be engaged in combat to be mobilised. Yet women carrying 
out alternative non-combative roles were surely equally mobilised in witnessing the 
horrors of war, supporting and constituting the machine that perpetrated it and being 
shaped psychologically and emotionally by its force. 
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The diverse roles played by women cannot be viewed exclusively. They were 
simultaneously fighters, bush wives, domestic workers, spies, farmers, sex slaves, 
nurses, herbalists, traditional healers and liaisons.
75
 When a woman operates as both a 
wife and a fighter, why is she a wife first and a fighter second? This multitude of roles 
should not result in their contribution being regarded as „less-than-warriors‟. Often these 
varied roles are conflated into the feminised category of „camp followers‟ which, 
despite passive connotations, are the backbone of rebel forces.
76
 These women raid for 
food, provide medical care, fetch water, gather intelligence, plan attacks and facilitate 
the functioning of the war economy.
77
 They also share the hardships of campaign, 
including extreme heat and cold, hunger and thirst, heavy burdens, uncomfortable 




A commonality of the experience of women mobilised in the conflict, whatever their 
role, was rape. Voluntary fighters, abducted sex slaves and all categories in between 
were subject to the familial system of camp life – favoured women were taken as „bush 
wives‟ (an informal wartime marriage) and others were for communal „use‟.
79
 When a 
wife was replaced by one younger or more attractive, she would be forced to fight on 
the frontline.
80
 Their release was disallowed lest they provide information to opponents 
of RUF tactics or atrocities.
81
 A Physicians for Human Rights report explains the bush 
wife system: 
The lives of „wives‟ in the camps were hellish…those caught while attempting to  
escape were killed as a deterrent to the others. As a survival strategy, many „wives‟  
cooperated with the male fighters, who, in turn, protected them…the rest were  
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communal property and all men had sexual rights over them. According to some of  
the girls, gang sex was a daily occurrence in the camps.82 
 
Such treatment caused extraordinarily high rates of sexually transmitted disease 
amongst the women, particularly HIV. The possibility of transmission was increased 
due to the violent nature of intercourse and associated risks of abrasion.
83
 The spreading 
of inhibiting or life-threatening disease, where this was even understood as taking place, 
was considered secondary to the perpetuation of the RUF by forcing women (whatever 
their mobilised capacity) to bear their children.
84
 If these women were not mobilised in 
the perpetuation of the conflict, then at the very least their reproductive systems were.  
 
In Sierra Leone, where recruitment took the form of both abduction and volunteering, 
civilians were forced to become combatants and thus also perpetrators. Even as the 
perpetrators of vicious violence, women were still the victims of rape and possibly 
abduction. Their homes became the frontline when they were forced to kill their 
families, neighbours and school teachers. As women fought, they also continued to 
provide the traditional private, home duties of the female as carers through cooking, 
cleaning and sexual gratification. While mobilised on the front, women carried on 
simultaneously as civilians. This unique position posed problems for the DDR 
programme, as shall be set out below. 
 
Sierra Leone‟s DDR programme was established under the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord 
with the intention of including women and men within its mandate. Its aims were 
threefold: to collect, register and destroy all conventional weapons; to demobilise 
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approximately 45,000 combatants; and to demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants.
85
 
The programme was funded and implemented as a joint project  by the Sierra Leonean 
government, the United Nations, the World Bank, various INGOs and donor 
governments (with a notable contribution from the United Kingdom).
86
 Phases I and II 
of the DDR programme required the voluntary surrender of a conventional weapon.
87
 
Those claiming to be combatants were questioned and often required to dissemble and 
reassemble a gun, usually an AK-47, to determine their status as a fighter.
88
 Note here 
that the model gun to be assembled to prove ones mobilised status did not include the 
Berreta submachine gun, the known weapon of the Combat Wives Unit. While it is 
likely that women within the Unit could also assemble an AK-47, the DDR standard 
shows from the outset a lack of tailoring to women‟s roles in the conflict. Phase III took 
a broader approach to DDR, recognising the limits of inclusion under Phases I and II. 
Group disarmament was allowed on the basis of turning in heavy weaponry that would 
have required multiple fighters for operation, such as rocket propelled grenades, mortars 
and heavy machine guns.
89
 Clips of ammunition were also accepted at some registration 
centres, though this was inconsistently applied.
90
 Phase III was intended to encourage 
female combatants to register, as their turnout in Phases I and II was disproportionately 
low. It is estimated that 72,500 combatants were disarmed across all of the phases, of 
which a mere 4,751 (or 6.5%) were women.
91
 Estimates of the overall number of 
women involved in fighting are as high as 30%, with others suggesting that there were 
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four to five bush wives for every conventional fighter.
92
 Such figures indicate that the 
non-participation of women is a systematic trend, requiring further analysis. 
 
Women were both expressly excluded from DDR programmes in some circumstances 
and chose not to participate in others. Both instances reveal an ignorance of the 
complicated position women occupy on the part of those designing and implementing 
the DDR process. First, the programme in Sierra Leone limited its understanding of 
mobilisation to that of a traditional armaments focus, thus excluding those who did not 
play a direct combat role, most often women.
93
 Second, even those women that did play 
a combat role often had their weapons removed by senior commanders (almost 
exclusively male) to be redistributed at a profit to men eager to gain the benefits of 
DDR.
94
 The programme carried out in Sierra Leone failed to appreciate the deep-seated 
gender stereotypes that would push women from the frontline back into the invisibility 
of the private home, denying them their demobilisation. The DDR process also failed to 
consider the fear that women often felt at the prospect of being encamped with their 
former abusers.
95
 This highlights the inability to make sense of the crossover of the 
roles of victim and perpetrator that women played. The DDR process saw the 
combatants as the perpetrators who needed to be neutralised, not recognising that some 
were also in fact victims of their fellow perpetrators. Women also face a moral 
discourse about fighting in war that men escape (more on this in the following 
chapter).
96
 Many women in Sierra Leone spoke of a stigma attached to those who were 
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involved in both combative and non-combative capacities with the RUF.
97
 Returnees 
were often shunned from their families and communities, unable to marry or reintegrate 
into society.
98
 Women who had volunteered, as well as those who had been abducted, 
were considered soiled: promiscuous and violent, contravening the norms of respectable 
female behaviour. The fear of such stigma caused many women not to enrol for DDR in 
the hope that they could bury their indecent past.
99
 Again, the DDR programme needed 
to go to greater lengths to foster awareness and acceptance within the community of 
those involved in the conflict in order to include women. 
 
Other women did not participate because by the standards of the programme, they 
would have been registered as children, eligible for a separate DDR programme.
100
 Yet 
many „girls‟, defined according to international standards as under eighteen years of age, 
considered themselves adults. They had children of their own, had been carrying out the 
responsibilities and tasks of an adult, had a bush husband and had fought alongside 
adults.
101
 The girls thus fell into a gap in the programme: still technically children but 
identifying, and being identified in their community, as adult. Some feared retribution 
for the atrocities they had committed or witnessed.
102
 Knowledge of the Sierra Leone 
National Truth and Reconciliation Committee, with reconciliatory powers, was often 
inaccurate and many were led to believe that they possessed retributive powers, capable 
of punishing former-combatants. Such misinformation was promoted to women as a 
reason for them to return home and allow men to take their place in DDR and gain its 
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 A general belief predominated that the entire DDR process was 
essentially a cash for guns programme tailored to men.
104
 The under-representation of 
women in the Sierra Leonean DDR process has ensured for them a more difficult road 
to post-conflict recovery. Research carried out in Uganda suggests that those who 
undergo demobilisation cope better with post-conflict life than those who do not.
105
 For 
example, they perform better at school, find alternative, sustainable work more easily 
and form stronger and more stable social relationships.
106
 Exclusion from 
demobilisation also makes transitions to civilian life potentially problematic in coping 
independently (or at least, without the support of the demobilisation infrastructure) with 
post-traumatic stress or psychological disorders, as well as physical injuries or 
disabilities.
107
 Undemobilised former-combatants also face wartime drug and alcohol 
addictions without the support that can be provided in DDR programmes.
108
 Women 
find it harder to gain employment and are often forced into prostitution, resulting in 
greater exposure to HIV and other venereal diseases.
109
 Due to the stigma of those who 
fought, women are also often considered unsuitable for marriage, thus humiliating 
themselves and their families, who may refuse to accept them.
110
 Being excluded from 
DDR, women are also largely barred from veteran‟s associations.
111
 Such alienation 
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Ultimately then, the conflict in Sierra Leone involved the mobilisation of women in 
many diverse capacities, and yet has not been followed up with a comprehensive DDR 
programme. Rather, the DDR programmes conducted in Sierra Leone have excluded 
women due to its emphasis on armaments and its disinclination to consider the social 
milieu that women returning from conflict face. This exclusion results in a 
disadvantaged position for women in post-conflict society, threatening from the outset 
its stability and sustainability. The particular moral discourse that women face in 
relation to conflict shall be examined in the following chapter, giving consideration to 


















Ch.4 – Problems of Perception: Women as Warriors 
Demobilisation plays a critical part in post-conflict endeavours to restore, build and 
maintain a positive peace, as well as to give meaning to the experience of war. It goes to 
the core of determining how conflict will be remembered and understood within a 
society. What elements and whose version to remember and enshrine as history depend 
upon the categories of inclusion and exclusion that take place in the crucial and fleeting 
post-conflict moment. How a society chooses to remember its past, whose experiences 
of humiliation, insecurity, solidarity, bravery and fear are endorsed, has implications for 
the present and future.
113
 It is a kind of retrospective judgement, in which some players 
are recognised and others overlooked. Such inclusions and exclusions within 
demobilisation programmes do not represent a truth or lie about who was or was not 
mobilised, but rather construct a particular reality that is needed in the present to 
facilitate the passing of the post-conflict moment. Exclusions also make DDR 
programmes practically effective (by delineating a manageable target group), and 
therefore simultaneously legitimate the programme itself. 
 
The traditional gender stereotypes that bind women and men to roles and characteristics 
that are portrayed as natural, act on the post-conflict moment to ensure a particular 
history is told.
114
 While women‟s roles may have broadened during conflict, any 
„liberation‟ that may have been achieved through it is too often „disremembered‟ when 
the fighting ceases.
115
 A post-war masculinisation ensues that tangibly remembers war 
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 Women are pushed back to the passive, private and feminised homestead, 
while men remain in the public arena, to actively determine political agendas and 
reconstitute armed forces (which female former-combatants are largely excluded 
from).
117
 Why is this selective programme followed and how is it possible, given that:  
Women have always and everywhere been inextricably involved in war, [but] hidden  
from history…During wars, women are ubiquitous and highly visible; when the wars  
are over and the war songs are sung, women disappear.?118 
 
This chapter examines the problems of perception that arise when women are deemed 
mobilised. In so doing examples of female warrior images will be drawn upon. The 
stereotypes that both inform and sprout from these images will then be considered, 
paying particular attention to the protector/protected relationship, on which the very 
purpose of war has often been premised, and the victim roles which are delineated as 
appropriate for women.  
 
The nub of this paper‟s critique of demobilisation in Sierra Leone centres on the 
inability to consider women, playing either combative or non-combative roles in 
conflict, mobilised. Demobilisation programmes are structured in such a way (not 
necessarily cognisantly) that women are excluded from their ambit. Images throughout 
history have fortified this reluctance to view women as mobilised and where they are 
admitted as so being, to delegitimate them as unnatural and unfeminine. The ancient 





Centuries BC, represents such an unnatural group.
119
 Living on the borderlands of the 
Greek Empire, these women were man-killing warriors who cut off one of their own 
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breasts to facilitate archery, controlled their offspring by sleeping with foreign men and 
murdered any sons they bore to maintain their single-sex society.
120
 Their world was 
depicted as topsy-turvy and in stark contrast to the ideal Athenian woman, reinforcing 
men‟s construction of their own patriarchal society as orderly and natural.
121
 “The 
popular image of an Amazon is hardly flattering: a big, burly, single-breasted female; 
hostile; unattractive, a woman who has chosen to act like a man.”
122
 The Amazons were 
suggestive of promiscuity, lust, disobedience and madness – characteristics highlighted 
to make their opposites (the feminine ideals espoused in patriarchal societies) seem 
natural and right. Yet a particular sexual appeal is still evident in these images. 
Amazons were dangerous, rebellious and thus, exciting. The poet Virgil (70BC – 19BC), 
writing during the Roman Empire, influentially spoke of „taming‟ the Amazons with 
stories of converting them through marriage, and of a beautiful Amazonian Queen.
123
 
Such overlap of unnatural, manly power figures and sex objects can be seen more 
recently in images such as Xena Warrior Princess and Lara Croft. Xena actress, Lucy 
Lawless, highlights the irony: 
As Xena, the tall, strong, athletic beauty with gloriously blue eyes is togged out in 
boots, a leather miniskirt and metal breastplates that do her breathtaking body no 
harm at all.124 
 
While such images may show female warriors in a gentler light than mere brusqueness, 
the implications are hardly flattering. The image is still suggestive of promiscuity and 
an unnatural lifestyle not befitting of a decent, feminine woman. This attitude was 
prevalent in Sierra Leone, where women involved in the fighting forces were ostracised 
from their communities post-conflict for being licentious, brutal and thus, 
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 Evidence from reintegration efforts suggest that it is easier to accept a 
male who underwent the wartime experience of: 
being forced to drink the water from human skulls, eating human flesh, collecting  
bags of ears and hands…beating your teachers or neighbours to death, killing your  
parent or sibling, torturing your colleagues.126  
 
The traditional role of women as givers of life and nurturers seems irreconcilable with 
the warmaking role that they are increasingly taking on.
127
 Despite a seeming 
acceptance of their contribution during conflict, women are stripped of the legitimacy of 
their experience post-conflict, as it jars with societal expectations. In Sierra Leone: 
 The power and status that some female fighters during the war had accrued from  
having the reputation of being some of the most vicious fighters, did not translate  
into any culturally accepted prestige in post-war society, on the contrary, those  
qualities were the very opposite of socially accepted female behaviour throughout  
 most of Sierra Leone.128 
 
The state of emergency environment that predominates during war provides a leniency 
for women and the roles that they are entitled to that peacetime does not. Exploiting this 
unnatural perception of female fighters, male combatants in Africa sometimes dress as 
women to enhance their magical powers and appear more frightening to their 
opponents.
129
 This inability to digest the fighting roles women may play suggests that a 
perception exists that they should be playing other roles instead. It is to these roles of 
women as victims and „the protected‟ that the paper now turns.  
 
Due to the construction of the feminine as passive, gentle and relatively weak, women 
have often been symbolised as the ideal victim. The United Nations has been accused of 
taking such an approach, and testimonies from Sierra Leone lend weight to such 
claims.
130
 Despite the October 2000 Security Council resolution on Women, Peace and 
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Security, which emphasised the integral role of women as fighters in conflict and post-
conflict peacemakers, on the ground the UN has continued to view women as victims.
131
 
To facilitate the collection of forces for DDR enrolment in Sierra Leone, CDFs and the 
RUF would assemble their fighters at meeting points, to be picked up by UN units. 
Reports have claimed that groups of up to 100 women were left behind, because the UN 
was under the impression that men, not women, were the perpetrators of the violence 
and required demobilisation.
132
 Such an approach denies agency to women outside of a 
particular construction of the victim role. It assumes women to be benign bystanders 
who are hurt, wounded and suffer powerlessly. It ignores the active efforts made and 
assumes that unlike men, women are not prey to the excitements of violence and the 
community mentality it fosters.
133
  It is an approach that is, as Naomi Wolf claims, 
“sexually judgemental” and “prescriptive”.
134
 This distinction between perpetrators 
(male) and victims (female) satisfies assumptions about appropriate roles for women. 
Exertion of informal control over women is maintained through the perpetuation of such 
stereotypes.
135
 Thus it can be seen that the role of women as victims is more 
comfortably accepted than their role as fighters, but why so? What purpose does female 
victimhood serve that it is so consistently reinforced? 
 
The rationale for violence depends heavily on the existence of those in need of 
protection. As the protected were traditionally immune from being targeted, this 
logically meant that they also could not fight.
136
 Monopolising on biological realities of 
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womanhood (that is, women as life-givers) and societal constructions (women as carers 
and nurturers), women were effectively categorised as „the protected‟.
137
 Thus, war was 
premised on men being mobilised to protect their women, who in turn had an obligation 
to fulfil their roles as being worthy of protection. Not to fulfil this role was considered 
unpatriotic, ungrateful and unfeminine, as indicated by images of French women being 
publicly paraded half-naked with their heads shaved for colluding with the enemy in 
World War II.
138
 A rejection of the role of the protected results in the very purpose of 
war being challenged (who is being fought for if the women do not need or want 
protection?) and the oppositional role of the male as protector being questioned (if she 
does not need protecting, he is no longer the protector). Thus the roles of protector and 
protected are mutually constructive of each other and dependent upon fulfilment of the 
other.
139
 The problem is that this binary does not represent what actual men and women 
are doing. While the neatness of the logic that „women need protection as they are 
victims because to not be a victim is unfeminine‟ is appealingly straightforward, it does 
not reflect the reality of the roles that women are playing in conflict and the 
transformation of the feminine that results. Women do participate in conflict. They: 
generate high profits for their commanders through looting and activities in illicit war 
economies, and it is their productive and reproductive labour that forms the backbone of  
many of today‟s rebel forces. They raid for and grow food, acquire medical supplies, fetch 
water, serve as porters, care for the wounded and provide information to plan future attacks. 
They supply the labour needed to extract diamonds, gold and other minerals, cut timber and 
load trucks and planes so that the war economies that make up and fuel today‟s armed 
can function. They are used to carry out the most violent attacks, which tear the fabric of  
their communities and nations. They fight and are killed.140 
 
The gendered stereotypes of females as unnatural fighters but natural victims in need of 
protection highlights the disconnect between the reality of conflicts such as Sierra 
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Leone, and assumptions governing post-conflict practices in these settings. Initiatives 
such as demobilisation cannot be conducted with such misconceptions in mind.  
 
The flipside of women‟s exclusion from demobilisation is their encouraged participation 
in development and post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
141
 This approach makes meagre 
steps towards granting agency beyond the bounds of victimhood, yet is still constrained 
by a slavish acceptance of women as solely nurturers and peacemakers. While it 
recognises that women have valuable contributions to make, it limits these contributions 
to the only arena in which women are perceived to be useful. It still denies the 
possibility of fighting women, or even alternatively mobilised women. By reserving for 
women this space in positive reconstruction efforts, is their exclusion as negative, 
combative agents simultaneously fortified? If so, granting women inclusion within post-
conflict peacebuilding efforts is perhaps a regressive step in affording them the 
recognition of unbounded agency that they deserve and, in reality, already act out.  
 
The implications of perceiving women in this way for DDR go beyond a denial of 
unbounded agency however. Practically, women are left in a mobilised state, because 
not being recognised as mobilised, they are not eligible to be demobilised. This is not to 
suggest that women remain traditionally mobilised, terrorising the population with guns. 
Rather that they will continue to operate with a mobilised mentality – viewing violence 
as an acceptable method of resolving problems, retaining a wartime regard for their 
enemies, not feeling that the war has officially ended for them, and that their 
contribution has been ignored.
142
 Accompanying such lack of resolution may be 
psychological trauma that goes undetected if they do not gain the benefit of medical and 
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psychological monitoring in demobilisation centres.
143
 This risks alienating them from 
their communities, leading to further discontent. In Sierra Leone, many female former-
combatants are living dangerous lives of prostitution, drug and alcohol abuse, as they 
have been unable to reintegrate into peacetime life.
144
 Aside from the personal hazards 
of being excluded from demobilisation, broader community safety may be jeopardised. 
Veterans of conflict are recognised as a significant social category in need of support 
post-conflict.
145
 Any frustrations or discontent that they may feel risks being converted 
into a return to violence either in their own community, or in neighbouring conflicts (as 
the crossover of fighters from Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote D‟Ivoire 
demonstrates). Thus for the sake of individual, as well as communal security, it is 
essential that those mobilised, in their various capacities, be demobilised, so that post-
conflict life may provide resolution to all who were involved in the conflict, and who 
should all be involved in the peace.  
 
Perceptions of women as inimical to images of warriors need to be revised to take into 
account the multitude of roles that women play in conflict, not simply those of victims, 
the protected and peacemakers. The unfeminine and sexualised figures of the few 
recognised female fighters also require demystifying, so that they can cease to be 
represented as unnatural. In such a way, the role of women in conflict can be revealed in 
all its manifestations, and thus allow mobilised women their right to demobilisation and 
sustainable post-conflict life.  
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Ch. 5: Reconfigurations: Decoupling Demobilisation from Disarmament  
 
Under current formulations, demobilisation implies a limited form of mobilisation 
operating largely to exclude women from its purview or, where women are considered 
mobilised, doing little to tailor programmes to their circumstances, resulting in their 
nonparticipation. Such exclusion is embedded in social consciousness through historical 
images and perceptions of gender, thus becoming difficult to unseat when it manifests in 
demobilisation practices. This chapter seeks to examine the possibilities for 
reconfiguring demobilisation so that women and other excluded categories can be more 
successfully integrated into its mandate. In order to do this, demobilisation needs to be 
delinked from its masculinist and traditionally-constant accomplice, disarmament. There 
is a danger however that broadening demobilisation by isolating it from disarmament 
will render the concept excessively loose and potentially meaningless. It risks being 
diluted to the extent that rather than maintaining its status of urgency and importance as 
a security practice, it merely becomes development assistance by another name. A way 
out of this predicament can be found however in the work of Duffield, who perceives a 
merging of security and development to be taking place that increasingly obscures the 
distinction between the two. It is within this overlapping space that demobilisation finds 
itself and where, as shall be argued below, it belongs. Thus, a reformulation of 
demobilisation that is inclusive and more representative of contemporary conflict, while 
still being practically viable, is possible if traditional preoccupations with associated 
disarmament and security status can be cast off.  
 
DDR programmes have traditionally come as a bundle. The components are a part of a 
singular whole: a post-conflict troika of demilitarisation, each serving a particular 
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purpose yet ultimately aiming for the same reinforcement of sustainable peace.
146
 
Disarmament, as the foundational component of the package, has been exposed to 
greater scrutiny and receives more funding than the later additions of demobilisation 
and reintegration.
147
 This is perhaps due to its longer history, but also its tangibility, 
measurability and strong connection to security. Disarmament can be seen, tested, 
recorded and justified as integral to the urgent enforcement of peace.
148
 By virtue of 
these traits, disarmament has a greater resonance with programme donors and 
stakeholders, again reinforcing its centrality in DDR processes.
149
 These characteristics 
afford disarmament a visibility and sense of importance that are denied to a greater 
extent to DDR‟s other components. Yet as has been discussed throughout this paper, it 
is the coupling of demobilisation with disarmament that often results in women being 
excluded from the processes of the former. The material-, armaments-focus of 
disarmament (that is, requiring the handing in of a conventional weapon for registration) 
is incognisant of the non-combat roles that the majority of women play in modern wars, 
as well as the practice of male superiors removing weapons from female fighters prior 
to demobilisation for personal profit. Disarmament thus ensures limited sight for the rest 
of the DDR package by imposing a standard for initial registration that limits enrolment 
to those who fit a picture of mobilisation in traditional conflict.
150
 It does not recognise 
the diverse roles played in contemporary wars and how these roles are integral to 
fighting, even if they do not carry a weapon.  
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By enshrining disarmament as the first stage of DDR, the purposes of demobilisation 
and reintegration are seen through the lens of this weapons-focused phase.
151
 The entire 
DDR process is weaponised, as it were, thus excluding many women and auxiliary 
personnel. For example, were demobilisation to precede disarmament in the DDR 
process, initial registration may be based more on determining mobilised mindsets and 
taking weapons off those with such a potentially dangerous mentality.
152
 This would 
involve extensive psychological analysis and behavioural observation. Practicality 
insists that disarmament will never be entirely comprehensive, particularly in parts of 
Africa where the trade in small arms and light weapons is reaching pandemic 
proportions.
153
 This being so, surely it is the attitude that makes these weapons 
dangerous that needs to be curtailed, instead of merely taking the weapons away when 
access to a seemingly endless supply can be easily tapped into. Indeed, destroying the 
gun-culture before the guns themselves may decrease the economic value of the 
weapons, with less demand, and their symbolic value, with less cultural prestige 
attached to the gun, thus potentially increasing the number of weapons handed in under 
a disarmament programme.
154
 This is not to suggest that disarmament is a futile process. 
It certainly has its purpose and correlations can no doubt be found between less guns 
and more peace.
155
 Yet ultimately this is treating the symptoms rather than the cause. If 
the mindset and culture that legitimates the violent use of weapons can be demobilised, 
then the existence of the weapons becomes a secondary concern.
156
 This is not the case 
when weapons are removed as the continuing prevalence of discontent then still remains 
dangerous. Thus, in order to capture women and other excluded categories within its 
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ambit, demobilisation must be divorced from the masculinist and armaments-focus of 
disarmament. This will allow it to better embrace the non-material elements of 
mobilisation, be they psychological, cultural and/or ideational, thus affording those 
mobilised in alternative capacities the opportunity of demobilising.   
 
Such a broadening of the demobilisation catchment through disassociation with 
disarmament may be open to criticism of becoming conceptually loose and expansive, 
and thus practically unviable in application.
157
 If mobilisation can extend from a 
material state of carrying weapons, to facilitating fighting through support capacities, to 
being able to mentally justify the use of violence as a negotiation tool, those eligible for 
demobilisation will be a group far larger than any cantonment area is capable of 
processing. Further, the panoply of experiences of mobilisation within the conflict will 
be too diverse to be amenable to any integrated programme. The further one digresses 
from the obvious security category of the weapon-wielding warrior, the less convincing 
demobilisation‟s claim to being a security issue (and thus being imbued with the 
urgency and importance that this carries) becomes.
158
 Demobilisation then risks being 
incorporated under that broad, catch-all category of „development assistance‟, and 
competing for funding and resources with the multitude of other projects that fall within 
its umbra.
159
 The specificity of purpose and demarcated targeting that programmes 
located within the security realm operate with may not be satisfied by the broadened 
scope of demobilisation posited here. Thus, does demobilisation simply become 
development policy by another name, losing its privileged position as a security issue in 
the process? 
                                               





Duffield‟s work on the merging of security and development may offer an alternative 
conception of the above quandary. He considers that the new wars have dissolved the 
conventional distinctions that gave traditional conflicts their logic, rendering 
contemporary wars in need of reconceptualisation.
160
 This reconceptualisation centres 
around the convergence of security and development that occurred throughout the 1990s 
and continues to be a defining feature of modern conflict.
161
 Duffield argues: 
 …there is a noticeable convergence between notions of development and security. Through 
 a circular form of reinforcement and mutuality, achieving one is now regarded as essential 
 for securing the other. Development is ultimately impossible without stability and, at the same 
 time, security is not sustainable without development.162   
 
Development has been „radicalised‟ and has gained an urgency, previously reserved for 
the domain of security, by virtue of underdevelopment being perceived as dangerous.
163
 
The causes of contemporary conflict are seen to be to do with standards of living, 
economic and lifestyle opportunities and social identities, rather than the traditional 
hard-nosed interests of states.
164
 This recognition necessitates a view of security that is 
not limited by its traditional separation from that which is social, grassroots and 
community-focused. Understandings of security must move from a state- and military-
focus, to a community- and people-centred approach, recognising development 
standards (be they social, economic, environmental et cetera) as integral to its 
sustainable achievement. From this viewpoint, demobilisation‟s shift from being a 
staunchly security practice to a security/development blend, more accurately reflects the 
nature of both security and development in the new wars. 
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Taking a more developmental approach to demobilisation also shifts the view one takes 
of former-combatants. Under the traditional DDR model set out in the first chapter, 
former-combatants are deemed threats to post-conflict peace due to their likelihood of 
resorting to a livelihood of violence, because they lack transferable skills for civilian 
work.
165
 This approach perceives former-combatants as a problem to be solved and does 
little in the way of fostering a positive community attitude towards them upon 
reintegration.
166
 In contrast to this, taking a more developmental approach that plays 
down the disarmament focus of DDR, former-combatants can be viewed as promising 
human capital, with skill potential and legitimate hopes and demands for the future.
167
 
Seeing former-combatants as a crucial component of post-conflict communities rather 
than potential weapon-wielding spoilers, is a more effective way of ensuring social 
cooperation and cohesion, central to building a sustainable peace. Decoupling 
demobilisation from disarmament allows this approach to be achieved by de-
emphasising the material-, weapons-focus of mobilisation, accentuating instead the 
developmental potential of former-combatants.  
 
The reconfiguration of demobilisation proposed goes some way to resolving two 
fundamental concerns with current DDR programmes highlighted in this paper. The first 
refers to the exclusion of women and the second to the changing nature of contemporary 
conflict. As has been demonstrated, women are excluded from demobilisation 
programmes due to DDR registration requirements of relinquishing a conventional 
weapon, a standard stemming from a lack of recognition of non-combat roles as 
sufficiently mobilised in conflict. This weapons-focus privileges the male who has 
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greater access to weapons and is less likely to play the variety of wartime roles that 
women do, which seem to detract from, rather than contribute to, the latter‟s claim to 
mobilised status. Removing the weapons-focused disarmament phase from 
demobilisation processes will allow other elements of mobilisation, such as the 
psychological, ideational and cultural factors to be considered in judging mobilisation 
claims.
168
 This approach will allow for the recognition of non-combat, auxiliary 
wartime roles and will not disenfranchise those women who fought but have had their 
weapons removed. Moreover, this reformulation would also allow the inclusion of 
traditional juju warriors, who have been excluded from current DDR programmes due 
to their carrying of homemade, rather than conventional, weapons. While the stereotype 
images of women as fighters will not be immediately resolved by this new approach, the 
gradual recognition of more women playing a diverse range of conflict roles will begin 
the process of disassembling such image‟s claims to represent a natural reality. In this 
way, the decoupling of demobilisation and disarmament will go some way to ensuring 
greater inclusion of women and other excluded categories from the ambit of 
demobilisation practices, thus contributing to a more fully demobilised and peaceful 
post-conflict society. 
 
The reconfigurations set out in this chapter are also more aware of the nature of 
contemporary conflict, and how it differs from traditional conflict. Accepting non-
traditional forms of mobilisation (that is, not just those who carry conventional 
weapons), recognises the blurring of the civilian/combatant divide and the various non-
military planes (for example, economic) around which conflict now also centres and 
                                               




 Further, the increased overlap that demobilisation, without its disarmament 
counterpart, accepts of development and security recognises the mutuality of these two 
realms and the causes of contemporary wars. Divorcing demobilisation and 
disarmament therefore acknowledges what is currently ignored by DDR programmes: 
the mobilisation of women and the blurring of traditional divides within contemporary 
conflict. Integrating this understanding into demobilisation processes will fortify the 
post-conflict peace being built by ensuring that communities are more thoroughly 
demobilised at the psychological, ideational and cultural levels.
170
 Rather than merely 
having the material means to express themselves removed through disarmament, 
demobilisation can independently ensure peaceful mentalities are established that take a 
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Conclusion: 
The conflict in Sierra Leone is an example of the new wars currently confronting the 
international community. The nature of the violence there is characteristic of the 
blurring of traditional wartime divides that previously provided security processes, such 
as DDR, with their discernable logic and applicability. Resting upon a shifting terrain, 
contemporary conflict defies resolution through such traditional post-conflict practices, 
as attempts at their application result in exclusions of those groups who were not 
accounted for in traditional formulations. Thus, as considered here, the category of 
women, as both fighters and auxiliary personnel, continues to be substantially 
underrepresented in demobilisation programmes because of a continuing adherence to 
outdated conceptions of conflict in which women are not represented as present. From 
this snapshot of women‟s involvement (or lack thereof) in Sierra Leone‟s 
demobilisation programme, an insight into who is considered mobilised in conflict can 
be glimpsed. The resistance to aknowledging women as combatants is both a cause and 
effect of their exclusion. Their essentialised position as victimised, protected, 
peacemakers is thus reified to support their ongoing exclusion. Any group of veterans 
omitted from post-conflict transitions pose a potential threat to the peace being 
established that should be averted. Upon investigation of this exclusion it becomes clear 
that the material- and armaments-focus of DDR, imposed upon demobilisation and 
reintegration components due to the overemphasis on disarmament, privileges the 
masculine. It is thus males who are viewed more naturally as mobilised in conflict. To 
escape this exclusionary DDR trap, demobilisation needs to be decoupled from 
disarmament, thus allowing it to be re-conceived as not only a material process, but also 
a psychological, ideational and cultural one. This approach will improve prospects for 
forging a positive peace as both the material threat of armed groups and the mindset that 
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prompts their actions can be pacified. In so doing, demobilisation programmes may 
operate with a wider registration standard, recognising the mobilisation of women and 
non-combative actors. Simultaneously, this approach reflects a more comprehensive 
representation of security that accounts for the changed nature of conflict. 
 
This paper has posited the above argument by considering the broad theoretical 
framework of DDR programmes and the evolution of demobilisation and how an 
understanding of mobilisation can be inferred from this basis. A case study of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone was then provided, highlighting the diverse roles played by 
women and how the DDR programme operated to exclude their participation. This 
preceded an examination of the perceptions of women in conflict and the roles that are 
deemed acceptable for them to play. Finally, an attempt to divorce demobilisation from 
disarmament was proposed as a solution to the exclusion of women, allowing 
registration on the basis of mobilised status, rather than combative status. This approach 
prioritises the establishment of a thorough, positive peace with demobilised mindsets, 
rather than simply a society free from weapons. It also recognises the blurring of 
development and security, and that demobilisation perhaps comfortably falls within this 
nexus, rather than belonging to the bounded realm of security alone. Embracing this 
developmental approach allows demobilisation to move away from the armaments-
focus of mobilisation and recognise the significance of the intangibles of psychology, 
culture and ideas. In turn, this conception of mobilisation allows a more comprehensive 
understanding of security and modern conflict. 
 
It has been seen how ideas of mobilisation are derived from a disarmament-dominated 
form of demobilisation and that they are also linked to an outdated binary codification 
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of conflict. The reliance upon distinctions between war and peace, combatants and 
civilians, protector and protected, perpetrator and victim and ultimately, men and 
women is representative of a Manichaean worldview that constructs, rather than reflects, 
reality. In this construction, women are erased from the war picture and instead 
embedded in a scene of essentialised images revolving around peace, the protected 
home and victimhood. This seeming need for wartime distinctions is captured in 
journalist/writer Kapuscinski‟s writing:  
 …what does it mean to think in wartime images? It means seeing everything as  
existing in a state of extreme tension, as breathing cruelty and dread. For wartime  
reality is a war of extreme, Manichaean reduction, which erases all intermediate hues,  
gentle, warm and limits everything to a sharp, aggressive counterpoint, to black and  
white, to the primordial struggle of two forces – good and evil. Nothing else of the 
battlefield! 
 
Reducing the complexity of contemporary conflict to simple binaries that provide an 
executable logic, does not help in gaining a deeper understanding of their phenomenon. 
Rather, this approach merely enshrines outdated conflict resolution practices, such as 
current DDR models, as suitable, when they in fact operate to exclude particular 
categories because of their reliance upon increasingly non-existent binaries. The roles of 
women in conflict are sidelined due to this reliance and post-conflict peace is weakened 
as a result. Social exclusion has been pointed to by former RUF combatants as a reason 
for the conflict in Sierra Leone, thus to inscribe further exclusion in the post-conflict 
peace would certainly be tempting fate.
171
 Including women within demobilisation 
programmes and post-conflict life more generally will require more than simply 
occupational alternatives. It will involve a transformation of the social structures and 
consciousness that continue to subject women and their life choices to a morally 
judgemental microscope. This is by no means a simple or straightforward process, yet 
its impact is considerably more far reaching than the experiences of the individual 
                                               
171 Fithens and Richards, „Making War, Crafting Peace‟, p. 117. 
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women alone. The inclusion of mobilised women within demobilisation efforts will also 
allow for a deeper understanding of, and thus ability to resolve, contemporary conflicts 
of which they are a crucial part. A demobilisation framework that recognises the 
involvement of all actors, in their various capacities, within contemporary conflict can 
be achieved if the traditional distinctions that were represented as characterising war in 
the past are let go. In this way, the armaments-focus of disarmament can relinquish its 
hold on demobilisation and both security and development can be embraced collectively, 
thus ensuring that mobilisation is determined not simply on the basis of wielding a 
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